Leisure the Basis of Culture

The concept of intellectual work has a number of historical antecedents, which can serve to clarify it.
First, it is based on a certain interpretation of the human knowing process.
What happens when our eye sees a rose? What do we do when that happens? Our mind does something, to be sure, in the mere fact of taking in the object, grasping its color, its shape, and so on. We have to be awake and active. But all the same, it is a ”relaxed” looking, so long as we are merely looking at it and not observing or studying it, counting or measuring its various features. Such observation would not be a ”relaxed” action: it would be what Ernst Jünger termed an ”act of aggression.”1 But simply looking at something, gazing at it, ”taking it in,” is merely to open our eyes to receive the things that present themselves to us, that come to us without any need for ”effort” on our part to ”possess” them.

There would scarcely be any dispute about this, if we were speaking about an act of sense perception.
But what about an act of knowing? When a human being considers something imperceptible to the senses, is there then such a thing as mere ”looking”? Or, to use the scholastic technical terminology, is there such a thing as ”intellectual vision”?
The ancient and medieval philosophers answered, ”Yes.” Modern philosophers have tended to say, ”No.”
To Kant, for instance, the human act of knowing is exclusively ”discursive,” which means not ”merely looking.” ”The understanding cannot look upon anything.” 2 This doctrine has been characterized, in brief, as ”one of the most momentous dogmatic assumptions of Kantian epistemology.”3 In Kant’s view, then, human knowing consists essentially in the act of investigating, articulating, joining, comparing, distinguishing, abstracting, deducing, proving – all of which are so many types and methods of active mental effort. According to Kant, knowing — (intellectual knowing, that is, by the human being) is activity, and nothing but activity.

It is no wonder that, starting from this basis, Kant was able to conclude that all knowing, even philosophy itself (since philosophy is at the greatest remove from sense perception), should be understood as a form of work.
And he said so expressly: in 1796, for example, in an article written to refute the Romantic ”vision” and ”intuitive” philosophy of Jacobi, Schlosser, and Stolberg.4 In philosophy, Kant objects, ”the law of reason is supreme, whereby property is possessed through labor.” And this Romantic philosophy cannot truly be a philosophy because it is not ”work.” This accusation he directs even against Plato, that ”Father of all raving enthusiasm in Philosophy,” while, Kant says with recognition and approval, ”Aristotle’s philosophy is truly work.” From such a perspective, originating from the exaltation of a ”philosophy of work,” the ”recently exalted, privileged tone of Philosophy” is branded as a false philosophy, in which one ”does not work but merely listens with delight to the oracle within oneself, in order to come into complete possession of the whole wisdom promised by philosophy.” And such a ”pseudo–philosophy” thinks itself superior to the strenuous labor of the true philosopher!
Now, ancient and medieval philosophy had quite the opposite view, without, of course, justifying any charge that philosophy was something ”easy.” Not only the Greeks in general – Aristotle no less than Plato – but the great medieval thinkers as well, all held that there was an element of purely receptive ”looking,” not only in sense perception but also in intellectual knowing or, as Heraclitus said, ”Listening-in to the being of things.”5
The medievals distinguished between the intellect as ratio and the intellect as intellectus. Ratio is the power of discursive thought, of searching and re-searching, abstracting, refining, and concluding [cf. Latin dis-currere, ”to run to and fro”], whereas intellectus refers to the ability of ”simply looking” (simplex intuitus), to which the truth presents itself as a landscape presents itself to the eye. The spiritual knowing power of the human mind, as the ancients understood it, is really two things in one: ratio and intellectus, all knowing involves both. The path of discursive reasoning is accompanied and penetrated by the intellectus’ untiring vision, which is not active but passive, or better, receptive – a receptively operating power of the intellect.
And something else must be added: the ancients likewise considered the active efforts of the discursive ratio to be the essentially human element of human knowing; ratio as the decisively human activity was contrasted with the intellectus, which had to do with what surpasses human limits. Of course, this ”super-human” power nevertheless does belong to man, and what is ”essentially human” alone does not exhaust the knowing power of human nature; for it is essential to the human person to reach beyond the province of the human and into the order of angels, the truly intellectual beings.
”Although human knowing really takes place in the mode of ratio, nevertheless it is a kind of participation in that simple knowing which takes place in higher natures, and we can thus conclude that human beings possess a power of intellectual vision.” These are the words of Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth.6 This statement means that human knowing is a partaking in the nondiscursive power of vision enjoyed by the angels, to whom it has been granted to ”take in” the immaterial as easily as our eyes take in light or our ears sound. Human knowing has an element of the non-active, purely receptive seeing, which is not there in virtue of our humanity as such, but in virtue of a transcendence over what is human, but which is really the highest fulfillment of what it is to be human, and is thus ”truly human” after all (in the same way, again
according to Thomas Aquinas, the vita contemplativa as the highest form of human living is not ”properly human, but superhuman”: non proprie humana, sed superhumana).7
For the ancient and medieval philosophers the ”laboring” nature of the human ratio was likewise a mark of its humanness. The operation of the ratio, its discursive thinking process, really is work, and a difficult activity.
But the simple act of the intellectus is not work. And whoever thinks, along with the ancients, that human knowing is a mutual interplay of ratio and intellectus; whoever can recognize an element of intellectual vision within discursive reasoning; whoever, finally, can retain in philosophy an element of contemplation of being as a whole such a person will have to grant that a characterization of knowing and philosophy as ”work” is not only not exhaustive, but does not even reach the core of the matter, and that something essential is in fact missing from such a definition. Certainly, knowing in general and philosophical knowing in particular cannot take place without the effort and activity of discursive reasoning, without the ”nuisance of labor” (labor improbus) involved in all ”intellectual work.” Even so, there is something else in it, and something essential to it, that is not work.
Excerpt from Leisure
The Basis of Culture
Josef Pieper
Introduction by Roger Scruton
New translation by Gerald Malsbary
St. Augustine’s Press
South Bend, Indiana
1998
- Blätter und Steine (Hamburg, 1934), p. 202. ↩︎
- I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. R. Schmidt (Leipzig, 1944) p. 91. ↩︎
- Bernhard Jansen, Die Geschichte der Erkenntislehre in der neueren Philosophie bis Kant (Paderborn,
1940), p. 235. ↩︎ - ”Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie,” Akademie-Ausgabe 8, pp. 387-
406. ↩︎ - Diels-Kranz, ed., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, frag. 112. ↩︎
- Q.XV,1. ↩︎
- Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus 1. ↩︎